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NOTE
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL
SYSTEM FAILURES: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM
HAYLEY N. LAWRENCE*
“It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of
the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.”†

Inconceivable no more. 2019 was a remarkable year in the world of
political system failures. The United States Supreme Court decided
Rucho v. Common Cause,1 which challenged partisan gerrymandering
in North Carolina and Maryland, and held that all cases—now and
forever—involving partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable
political questions. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, relied
heavily on the notion that political gerrymandering cases lacked
“judicially manageable standards” to determine when a State has gone
too far in drawing its districts on partisan lines.2 These cases even had
the proverbial smoking gun: legislators and members of the executive
explicitly admitting an intent to draw voting districts in such a way as
to deprive members of the opposing political party of any effective
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† Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 230 (1962) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345
(1960)).
1. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
2. Id. at 2491.
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voice in the political process. But the Court abdicated its constitutional
duty to prevent the State from infringing on the constitutional rights
guaranteed to the People, under the guise of avoiding a confrontation
with “the political thicket.”3
In 2016, the British people voted to withdraw from the European
Union (E.U.). Since then, the British Parliament has been attempting
to negotiate a “Brexit” trade deal with the E.U. In August 2019, in
anticipation of the no-deal Brexit deadline on October 31, Prime
Minister Boris Johnson asked Queen Elizabeth II to prorogue4
Parliament for five weeks. In a normal political climate, prorogation
does not provoke much of a reaction. But the length of this prorogation
(which is unprecedented in modern history),5 in the context of an
impending no-deal Brexit and a Parliament fraught with political
partisanship, Prime Minister Johnson’s recommendation ignited
intense backlash from political allies and opposition alike. Gina Miller,
a private citizen, and seventy-eight Members of Parliament challenged
the prorogation in the U.K. courts.6 Lower courts were split: one ruled
on the merits,7 and the other ruled that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question.8 Consolidated on appeal, the United
Kingdom Supreme Court determined the cases to be within the scope
of judicial review.9 Reaching the merits, the Court pronounced that the
prorogation frustrated “the constitutional role of Parliament in holding
the Government to account” without reasonable justification.10 The

3. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (“Courts ought not to enter this political
thicket” because it is the proper role of Congress to remedy unfairness in districting.).
4. In exercise of her royal prerogative and on the advice of the Privy Counsel, the Crown
may prorogate, or suspend, a session of Parliament. See R (on the application of Miller) v The
Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41 [3]. Prorogation is not to be confused with the dissolution of
parliament, which immediately precedes a general election. See id. at [4].
5. From 1999 to 2017, the average length of a single prorogation was eight calendar days.
For the full report detailing lengths of prorogations from 1900 to 2017, see Matthew Purvis,
Lengths of Prorogation since 1900, U.K. PARLIAMENT: HOUSE OF LORDS LIBR. (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/LLN-2019-0111#fullreport.
This is by no means the longest prorogation in British history, however. That title remains with
Charles I, who, in 1629, prorogued Parliament until 1640. See Ajay Sarma, Political Prorogation:
What Are the Implications for British Politics?, HARV. POL. REV. (Oct. 12, 2019),
https://web.archive.org/web/20200617164131/https://harvardpolitics.com/world/britishprorogation/.
6. Sarma, supra note 5.
7. Joanna Cherry QC MP and Others for Judicial Review [2019] CSOH 70 (Scot.).
8. R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB).
9. R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41 [52] (“[T]he courts
can rule on the extent of prerogative powers.”) (hereinafter Miller).
10. Id. at [55], [58–61].
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Court thus nullified the prorogation.11
John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory of judicial
review helps to distinguish the role of courts envisioned in Rucho and
Miller. His theory is thus: the courts should act like referees, intervening
when one side gets an unfair advantage, not when the “wrong side”
scores.12 This means that when the political processes are undeserving
of trust, either because certain groups are denied access or because
representatives are operating in flagrant disregard of constituents’
interests, courts are uniquely competent to intervene.13
This note compares the respective political question doctrines of
the United States and the United Kingdom to evaluate Rucho14
through Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review.
Rucho and Miller present instances of political system failures,15
involving one branch’s attempt to accrete power and usurp the
democratic process. Both cases illustrate why the Court’s duty to
protect individual liberties from state infringement is at its zenith when
system failures denigrate the political process. That calling is all the
more critical when the individual liberty at stake is meaningful
participation in the process itself. In Rucho, the Court ignored this
calling, abdicating its duty to intervene. Examining Miller reveals where
the Court erred in Rucho: (1) Miller is an exemplar of the
representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review, (2) Miller offers
critical insights to contrast the Court’s approach in Rucho, and (3)
Miller offers an example of “judicially manageable standards” for
determining when a branch has exceeded the constitutional boundaries
of its powers—a standard that the majority in Rucho so desperately
seeks. At bottom, Rucho got it wrong and Miller can help us see why.
Rucho was decided recently, so legal academia has not yet had the
opportunity to respond thoroughly. The decision has received some
attention from academics thus far,16 but nearly all of it is confined to
commentary in the popular media.17 Miller, however, has received
11. Id. at [70].
12. ELY, infra note 171, at 102–03.
13. Id.
14. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
15. Defined infra III.A.
16. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking About Law and
Democracy in Rucho v. Common Cause, AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV. 2018–19 (Sept. 24,
2019), https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme-court-review/dirty-thinking-about-law-anddemocracy-in-rucho-v-common-cause/.
17. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed: The Supreme Court just abdicated its most
(June
27,
2019),
important
role:
enforcing
the
Constitution,
L.A. TIMES
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relatively more attention from academia.18 Still, the existing literature
on either side of the pond has not fully incorporated lessons from the
field of comparative law. Only one scholar has undertaken a
comparative study of the political question doctrine in the United
States and the United Kingdom, but her work focused primarily on the
Israeli doctrine as the analytical interlocutor.19 This paper aims to fill
the gap: compare the respective doctrines, draw insights from the U.K.
political question doctrine as seen in Miller, and use those insights to
inform a discussion of the political question doctrine in cases of
political system failures, focusing on Rucho.
This Note first briefly introduces the origins of the political
question doctrine in the United States (I.A.), presents the U.S. Supreme
Court’s modern formulation (I.B.), discusses the political
gerrymandering caselaw predating Rucho (I.C.), and examines the
application of the doctrine in Rucho (I.D.). It briefly presents the
argument for a comparative study (II.A.). It then explains the origins
(II.B.) and modern formulation of the United Kingdom’s political
question doctrine (II.C.), closing with a thorough discussion of Miller
(II.D.). The analysis section first explores Ely’s representationreinforcement theory of judicial review and defines “political-system
failures” (III.A). Then, it applies the representation-reinforcement
theory to Rucho and Miller, explaining why each fits the definition of a
political system failure (III.B.). Using insights gleaned from Miller, the
paper proposes judicially manageable standards for evaluating partisan
gerrymandering claims and explains why courts are institutionally
competent to adjudicate them (III.C.). And finally, it responds to
anticipated criticisms (III.D.).

https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chemerinsky-supreme-court-gerrymandering20190627-story.html; Charles Fried, A Day of Sorrow in American Democracy, THE ATLANTIC
(July 3, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/rucho-v-common-causeoccasion-sorrow/593227/.
18. See generally Sam Shirazi, The U.K.’s Marbury v. Madison: The Prorogation Case and
How Courts Can Protect Democracy, U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 108 (2019) (comparing and
contrasting Miller with Marbury v. Madison and discussing the implications of Prorogation on the
U.K.’s attempt to leave the E.U.).
19. See generally Margit Cohn, Form, Formula, and Constitutional Ethos: The Political
Question/Justiciability Doctrine in Three Common Law Systems, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 675 (2011).
Other scholars have undertaken comparative analyses between the political question doctrines of
the U.S. and Israel and the U.S. and South Africa, respectively. See generally Elad Gill, Judicial
Answer to Political Question: The Political Question Doctrine in the United States and Israel, 23
B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 245 (2014); Mtendeweka Mhango, Is It Time for a Coherent Political Question
Doctrine in South Africa? Lessons from the United States, 7 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 457 (2014).
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE U.S. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
A. Origins
The traditional view among scholars20 is that the American political
question doctrine was first proclaimed in Marbury v. Madison. In that
opinion, Chief Justice Marshall pronounced that “[q]uestions, in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to
the executive, can never be made in this court.”21 It remained for the
Court to determine whether an issue raised a political question—one
that only the political branches were equipped to decide—or one over
which the Court could exercise its power of judicial review.22 Chief
Justice Marshall identified some guidelines in determining whether a
question was “political in nature”: “The subjects are political. They
respect the nation, not individual rights” and arise from those parts of
the Constitution which empower the political branches to exercise their
discretion.23 Further, the Court provided examples of what would
constitute quintessentially political questions: (1) the President
exercising his power of appointment and nominating a candidate for
the Senate’s approval, and (2) acts of an officer of the Executive
pertaining to foreign affairs and complying with direct orders from the
President.24 Marshall noted, however, that certain actions by an
executive officer acting on behalf of the President would be reviewable
by the courts “when [a government officer] is directed peremptorily to
perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the
performance of those acts; he is . . . amenable to the laws for his conduct,
and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.”25 In
20. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For the traditional view, see, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 248–50 (2002) (noting that Marbury marked the first
pronouncement of the Political Question Doctrine in American jurisprudence); Michelle D.
Gouin, United States v. Alvarez Machain: Waltzing with the Political Question Doctrine, 26 CONN.
L. REV. 759, 763–64 (1994) (noting that the Political Question Doctrine was born from Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question
Doctrine, 137 PENN. L. REV. 97, 102 (1988) (“The political question doctrine stems from Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison.”). But see generally Tara Leigh Grove, The
Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908 (2015) (criticizing the
traditional understanding of the doctrine’s origins and proposing instead that the current doctrine
“was not created until the mid-twentieth century, when it was employed by the Supreme Court
to entrench, rather than to undermine, its emerging supremacy over constitutional law.”).
21. Id. at 170.
22. Id. at 167, 170–71.
23. Id. at 166, 170.
24. Id. at 166–67.
25. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
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short, the Court had no power to review Executive actions that did not
implicate individual rights.
Marbury’s logic was rooted in separation of powers principles. In
accepting the decisions of the political branches as binding, the
judiciary exercised deference and respected institutional
competencies.26 Deference precluded courts from substituting their
own preferences for those of the political branches—they could
exercise only their judgment and not their will.27 According to Chief
Justice Marshall, the judiciary is empowered only to declare what the
law is—not decide what the law should be.28
Finally, the concept of political accountability underpins much of
the Court’s logic in Marbury: “By the constitution of the United States,
the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the
exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable
only to his country in his political character and to his own
conscience.”29 The Constitution affords the President the authority to
make political decisions, and if the people—from whom the
Constitution itself derives supreme authority—disagree with the
President’s choices, they have full recourse to express their
discontentment through the political process.30 Therefore, when the
decisions were political and did not infringe on individual rights,
judicial review was unnecessary to curtail a rogue Executive. Similarly,
the argument goes, Congress is elected by the people and is thus
directly accountable to them should it fail to adequately represent their
interests. These principle considerations similarly underpin the British
political question doctrine.31
B. The Modern U.S. Political Question Doctrine
The justifications for the modern political question doctrine remain
the same. First, it is predicated on horizontal separation of powers.
There are certain judgments that the political branches are both

26. See id. at 165–66 (noting that the Constitution entrusted the President with certain
powers to be exercised at his discretion).
27. See id. at 170–71, 177.
28. See id. at 177–78 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”).
29. Id. at 165–66.
30. Id. at 166 (“[I]n cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion,
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable.” (emphasis
added)).
31. Discussed infra Section II.
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constitutionally entitled and functionally more competent to make.
Second, judicial review is the inappropriate avenue for redress (unless
the dispute involves individual rights) because representatives are
accountable to their constituents through the traditional political
process.
The Court announced the modern formulation of the political
question doctrine test in Baker v. Carr.32 In Baker, plaintiffs challenged
the Tennessee legislature’s apportionment of voting districts on Equal
Protection33 grounds, alleging that the current apportionment
effectively debased their votes of any value because Tennessee had not
reevaluated its voting districts to account for significant demographic
changes that had occurred over the past sixty years.34 The Court held
that the case did not present a nonjusticiable political question and
ruled on the merits.35 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan noted
that “the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does
not mean it presents a political question.”36 Furthermore, “the right to
relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the fact
that the discrimination relates to political rights.”37 Although the Court
did not find this case to present a nonjusticiable political question, it set
forth the contours of the doctrine.38
The political question doctrine is a “function of the [horizontal]
separation of powers” between the judiciary and the political branches
of the federal government.39 And although it remains the province of
the courts to interpret the Constitution and determine when a branch
has exceeded its authority, some exercises of constitutional authority
fall outside the scope of judicial review.40 The Court refused to erect
categorical barriers to judicial review in certain subject-matter areas,
like foreign affairs,41 and instead opted for case-by-case inquiry.42 Cases
involving any of the following elements may present nonjusticiable
32. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
33. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
34. Baker, 369 U.S. at 193–94.
35. Id. at 199–200.
36. Id. at 209.
37. Id. at 210 (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944)) (internal quotations
omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 211.
41. See id. (“Yet it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”).
42. Id. at 210–11.
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political questions:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.43

This formulation is a chimera of both textual44 and prudential45
considerations. Baker, however, provided no guidance as to how these
factors would apply to future cases, how the Court should weigh the
factors relative to one another, or if and when any of them would be
dispositive. It is no surprise, then, that future courts filled in the gaps.
C. The U.S. Political Question Doctrine and Gerrymandering Cases
Gerrymandering refers to “the practice of dividing a geographical
area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one
political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting
strength.”46 As Chief Justice Roberts noted in Rucho v. Common Cause,
gerrymandering has a long and sordid history in United States
politics.47 Over the course of the twentieth century, the Court resolved
cases involving racial and partisan gerrymandering, paralleling a
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review.48 For example,
the Court held that constitutional challenges to the apportionment of
districts based on population were subject to judicial review.49 In cases

43. Id. at 217.
44. See id. (For example, “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue”).
45. See id. (For example, “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments”).
46. Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999).
47. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019).
48. See ELY, infra note 171, at 87.
49. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016) (holding unanimously that in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause’s “one-person, one-vote” principle, the state may
design its voting districts based on the state’s total population); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725
(1983) (striking down New Jersey’s apportionment plan as violating the Apportionment Clause
(U.S. CONST. Art. I § 2) because the State failed to make a good faith effort to achieve as near to
population equality as is practicable); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (upholding
districts in Connecticut on the grounds that exact mathematical parity for the districts was not
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asserting racial gerrymandering claims, the Court has never once ruled
that the issue presented a nonjusticiable political question.50 And in the
realm of partisan gerrymandering, the Court had previously found
these cases to be justiciable, escaping the political question doctrine’s
kiss of death. But the twenty-first century proved too much for partisan
gerrymandering claims, with Rucho delivering the fatal blow.
Baker held that the parties had standing to challenge the state’s
districting scheme on equal protection grounds (in addition to laying
out the modern Political Question Doctrine test).51 Although Baker did
not involve state discrimination on the basis of political affiliation, it
laid the groundwork for the cases to come. Gaffney v. Cummings was
the next important case in the partisan gerrymandering saga.52 In
Gaffney, Connecticut adopted a policy of “political fairness,” which
aimed to apportion the districts to affect “proportional representation
of the two major political parties” in the state’s House and Senate.53
Voters challenged that policy as violating the Equal Protection
Clause.54 In other words, the policy aimed to structure voting districts
so the resulting composition of both houses would reflect “as closely as
possible . . . the actual [statewide] plurality of votes on the House or
Senate lines in a given election.”55 The Apportionment Board
determined the appropriate ratio of Republican to Democrat seats,
based not on party membership within the respective districts, but
rather on the party voting results in the past three statewide elections.56
The Court ruled that the “political fairness” plan did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because aiming to provide proportional
representation to its constituents based on political party affiliation was

required); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that because “[l]egislators represent
people, not trees or acres,” both houses of the state legislature must be apportioned according to
population, and the state is required to reevaluate its districts to account for population changes
at least every ten years); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (ruling that electoral districts
must be drawn so that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is
worth as much as another’s”).
50. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42 (1986) (holding that vote dilution on racial
grounds violated the Equal Protection Clause).
51. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (“the appellants have standing to challenge
the Tennessee apportionment statutes.”). Apportionment refers to “the allocation of
congressional representatives among the states based on population, as required by the 14th
Amendment.” Apportionment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
52. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
53. Id. at 738.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting testimony in the record).
56. Id.
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a legitimate state interest.57 Underlying the Court’s reasoning is the
notion that giving people fair representation in the state legislature is
not depriving them of anything. Quite the contrary—the plan
safeguards the potency of each vote from dilution. Finally, Gaffney
noted that districting plans “may be vulnerable [to equal protection
challenges] if racial or political groups have been fenced out of the
political process and their voting strength invidiously minimized,”58 a
prescient foreshadowing of the claims presented in Davis v.
Bandemer.59
In Bandemer, citizens of Indiana claimed that by diluting the votes
of Democrats, the state’s apportionment plan violated the Equal
Protection Clause.60 Bandemer held that partisan gerrymandering
claims did not present “political questions” and were thus justiciable in
federal courts as equal protection claims.61 Justice White, again writing
for the majority, acknowledged several cases in which the Court had
summarily affirmed lower rulings that equal protection claims
involving partisan gerrymandering were nonjusticiable.62 But the Court
effectively disposed of them as nonbinding precedent, instead
reasoning by analogy that because population apportionment and
racial gerrymandering claims were justiciable, partisan gerrymandering
claims must be too.63 The Court then applied the Baker test, finding
none of the factors determinative of a political question.64 Reaching the
merits, the Court refused to distinguish the claims of political groups
from those of racial minorities, whose claims the Court regularly held
to be justiciable.65 Acknowledging that members of political parties had
not been subject the same stigma over the course of history as racial
minorities, nor was affiliation with a political group an immutable
characteristic, the Court was unpersuaded that these distinctions
warranted a finding of non-justiciability.66 Bandemer established the
test for establishing a prima facie equal protection claim in political
gerrymandering cases: plaintiffs must show an “intentional
57. Id. at 754.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
60. Id. at 113.
61. Id. at 124.
62. Bandemer, 478 U.S at 120 (citing WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), summarily
aff’g 238 F.Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
63. Id. at 121.
64. Id. at 122.
65. Id. at 125.
66. Id.
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discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group.”67 Reiterating, the Court stated,
“where unconstitutional vote dilution is alleged in the form of
statewide political gerrymandering, the mere lack of proportional
representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional
discrimination.”68 To establish a claim, plaintiffs would have to show
that the apportionment would “consistently degrade . . . a group of
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”69
In concurrence, Justice O’Connor advocated that there is no need
for judicial intervention, much less a constitutional justification for it,
because partisan gerrymandering is a “self-limiting enterprise” and
that “[t]here is no proof before us that political gerrymandering is an
evil that cannot be checked or cured by the people or by the parties
themselves.”70 Justice O’Connor would have treated the claim as a
nonjusticiable political question, not because the subject was political
in nature, but because the political processes can adequately curb any
constitutional violation.71 Justice O’Connor’s objections in Bandemer
would lay the groundwork for the plurality in Vieth v. Jubelirer72 and
the majority in Rucho.73
The plaintiffs in Vieth challenged Pennsylvania’s newly drawn
electoral districts, alleging that they amounted to unconstitutional
political gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.74 In
a 4-1-4 split, the Court held that unless plaintiffs could identify judicially
manageable standards for determining when a constitutional violation
had occurred, partisan gerrymandering claims presented a
nonjusticiable political question.75 Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality,
argued that partisan gerrymandering cases were categorically nonjusticiable political questions.76 The Scalia plurality justified
overturning Bandemer on the grounds that in the eighteen years since

67. Id. at 127. For John Hart Ely’s discussion and critique of Bandemer, see Gerrymanders:
The Good, The Bad and The Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607, 616–23 (1998).
68. Bandemer, 478 U.S at 132.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 152. (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
71. Id. at 144–46, 155.
72. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
73. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
74. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the one-person-one-vote
principle in Article I, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, but they are not relevant to the discussion here.
Id.
75. Id. at 281.
76. Id.
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that decision was announced, courts had not successfully identified a
consistent, manageable standard for adjudicating partisan
gerrymandering claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.77 In short,
the plurality’s concerns were prudential ones.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, providing the fifth vote
necessary to resolve the case. He wrote that the Court should not adopt
a categorical rule for partisan gerrymandering cases, but should instead
rule narrowly that the present case was not justiciable for want of
judicially manageable standards.78 Vieth left the door open for future
litigants to claim equal protection violations in partisan
gerrymandering claims and invited them to propose judicially
manageable standards.79 Therefore, although it has been argued that
Vieth effectively overturned Bandemer, that would not formally occur
until Rucho.
In bitter dissent, Justice Stevens advocated that “it would be
contrary to precedent and profoundly unwise to foreclose all judicial
review of [partisan gerrymandering] claims that might be advanced in
the future.”80 Justice Stevens would have affirmed Bandemer and its
predecessors and held that the same “judicially manageable
standard[s]” used in racial gerrymandering cases should apply to
“other species of gerrymanders.”81 For Justice Stevens, discriminating
on party lines instead of racial ones would not remedy the district’s
constitutional deficiency.82 Instead, Justice Stevens would have adhered
to the following standard: “If no neutral criterion can be identified to
justify the lines drawn, and if the only possible explanation for a
district’s bizarre shape is a naked desire to increase partisan strength,
then no rational basis exists to save the district from an equal
protection challenge.”83

77. Id. at 279.
78. Id. at 309–10 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In accordance with the Marks rule, which
requires that the holding in a plurality case be limited to the narrowest grounds of agreement
between the concurrence and the plurality, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence controls. Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
79. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (“If workable standards do emerge to measure . . . burdens,
however, courts should be prepared to order relief.”)
80. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 318, 320, 336.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 339.
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D. The Political Question Doctrine Applied: Rucho v. Common Cause
And finally, equal protection claims for partisan gerrymandering
reached their final resting place in Rucho. Voters in Maryland and
North Carolina brought equal protection challenges, among others, to
the voting districts in their respective state.84 In North Carolina, the
record clearly demonstrated that Republican leadership intended to
dilute the voting strength of Democratic constituents in the state.85 A
member of the redistricting committee stated, “I think electing
Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this map to
help foster what I think is better for the country.”86 The map chosen
predicted the election of ten Republicans and three Democrats, and
that was the exact result in 2016 and 2018.87 And in Maryland,
Governor O’Malley sought to redraw the districts to flip one
Republican stronghold to a Democrat seat, making the tally seven
Democrats to one Republican.88 He later admitted that entrenching
Democratic power was his purpose for the redistricting effort.89 And
again, the gerrymander worked exactly as predicted—the election
resulted in seven Democrats and one Republican, despite no major
population or demographic shifts in the state’s electorate.90
Writing for the Rucho majority, Chief Justice Roberts concluded
that “partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions
beyond the reach of the federal courts.”91 The holding is predicated on
three principles: (1) “the Constitution supplies no objective measure
for assessing whether a districting map treats a political party fairly,”92
(2) the Founders were well aware of gerrymandering problems but
allocated redistricting authority to the political branches anyway,
thereby depriving courts of oversight,93 and (3) that states are the more
appropriate fora to deal with the problem.94 The fundamental holding
in Rucho is that the Court was unable to find judicially manageable
legal standards for determining when an electoral map has gone too

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2493.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2506–07.
Id. at 2501.
Id. at 2496.
Id. at 2507–08.
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far.95 The majority expressed concerns that if courts adjudicated
partisan gerrymandering claims without such rules, they could impose
their own visions of “fairness” on the electoral map.96 Finally, the Chief
Justice stated that securing partisan advantage in drawing electoral
maps is a permissible government objective.97 But in a feat of mental
gymnastics, he also purported not to condone excessive partisan
gerrymandering, while depriving the courts of a voice in the matter
altogether.98
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,
excoriated the majority for abdicating its constitutional obligation to
declare the law.99 The dissent contended that extreme partisan
gerrymanders amount to constitutional violations: “districters . . . set
out to reduce the weight of certain citizens’ votes . . . thereby
depriv[ing] them of their capacity to ‘full[y] and effective[ly]
participat[e] in the political process[].’”100 At bottom, vote dilution on
the basis of someone’s political affiliation frustrates their ability to
participate equally and meaningfully in popular elections. The dissent
looked to state courts and found, contrary to what the majority would
have us believe, that states have successfully crafted “neutral and
manageable and strict standards” without “a shred of politics about
them” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims.101 Those tests
look to (1) intent (was the state officials’ “predominant purpose” in
drawing the lines to “entrench their party in power” by diluting
opposition voters?),102 (2) effects (did the lines, in fact, substantially
dilute opponents’ votes?),103 and (3) causation (if plaintiffs make a
prima facie case on the first two elements, can the State provide a
legitimate, non-partisan justification for the map?).104 These tests are
the sort of thing, the dissent argued, that courts work with every day.105
The dissent naturally posed the question, If they can do it, why can’t
we?106 The dissent also rejected the majority’s claim that any findings
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
(2015)).
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 2500–01.
Id. at 2499–500.
Id. at 2503.
Id. at 2507.
Id. at 2525 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2514 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)).
Id. at 2525.
Id. at 2516 (quoting Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. ___
Id. at 2516.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2524.
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of constitutional violations would be “mere prognostications” about
the future, instead declaring that lower courts have grounded their
determinations on concrete evidence of past, present, and future
constitutional harms in the form of vote dilution.107 Finally, the dissent
argued that partisan gerrymandering threatens the very foundation of
representative democracy—it is “anti-democratic in the most profound
sense.”108 The State’s power emanates from the people. Its legitimacy
requires that its constituents have a meaningful choice in who
represents them.109 Political gerrymandering deprives certain
constituents of that choice, allows leaders to entrench themselves in
power, and “imperil[s] our system of government.”110
II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. The value of comparative analysis and why the U.K. is an
appropriate comparison
Critics of the field of comparative constitutional law regularly
object to using foreign sources in interpreting U.S. constitutional law
on the grounds that the United States does “not have the same moral
and legal framework as the rest of the world, and never ha[s]”111 and
that the notion that “American law should conform to the laws of the
rest of the world ought to be rejected out of hand.”112 But because the
U.S. and U.K. political question doctrines share the same basic
principles, and both countries are facing similar legal and political
107. Id. at 2519.
108. Id. at 2525.
109. Id. (citing Alexander Hamilton, 2 Debates on the Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1891)).
110. Id. at 2525.
111. Justice Scalia persistently objected to the Court’s citation or reference to foreign caselaw
in its own constitutional decision-making. Potent in his reasoning is an element of American
exceptionalism: that the United States is distinct in its legal history, philosophy, and identity, and
as such, no other legal system in the world is comparable. Justice Scalia’s categorical rejection of
using foreign law also relies on two other principles: first, he sees it as an affront to the democratic
principle of popular sovereignty: doubting “whether [the American people] would say ‘Yes, we
want to be governed by the views of foreigners,’” having not adopted their laws through the
traditional democratic process. Second, he challenges the criteria on which judges select foreign
law for support: “[w]hen it agrees with what the justices would like the case to say, we use the
foreign law, and when it doesn’t agree we don’t use it.” For the full interview, see The Relevance
of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation between Justice Antonin
Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005).
112. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s discussion of these foreign
views . . . is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since “this Court[] . . . should
not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.” (citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990
n.1 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
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challenges, that criticism bears limited weight here. The doctrinal
similarities between the two provide a sound basis for comparative
analysis. And although the structure of their respective constitutional
systems may differ, both countries share the concept of judicial review
and cordon off certain policy areas as “non-justiciable.”113 What’s more,
both nations’ philosophies about judicial review of political questions
are predicated on separation of powers principles and concerns about
institutional competence.
B. The U.K. Political Question Doctrine: Foundations
The political question doctrine in the U.K. is simply referred to as
non-justiciability. The principle of justiciability is “not one of discretion,
but . . . inherent in the very nature of the judicial process,” 114 meaning
that by imposing restrictions on themselves, courts recognize “the limits
of judicial expertise and . . . the proper demarcation between the role
of the courts and the responsibilities of the executive” in the
constitutional order.115 Put simply, courts acknowledge that the political
branches may be more competent to make certain decisions, and in
those instances, courts bow out, deferring to those decisions. As Lord
Sumption declared, “[t]o say that an issue is nonjusticiable is to say that
there is a rule of law that the courts may not decide it.”116 Indeed, U.K.
Courts also look for “judicially manageable standards” to guide such a
decision.117 And like the U.S. doctrine, whether a question is justiciable
is determined on a case-by-case basis.118 Before 1984, all cases involving
the royal prerogative were categorically exempt from judicial review.119

113. This pattern is particularly notable in cases challenging executive foreign affairs
powers—namely, the use of military force and treatymaking power. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (“[I]t is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private
litigation . . . which challenges the legality, the wisdom or the propriety of the Commander-inChief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region.”); Blackburn v Attorney
General [1971] 2 All ER 1380 (Lord Denning holding that an exercise of the prerogative power
of the Crown in the making of treaties “cannot be challenged or questioned in these courts”).
114. See Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (No.3), [1982] A.C. 888, 932 (Lord Wilberforce).
115. Dominic McGoldrick, The Boundaries of Justiciability, 58 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 981, 984
(2010).
116. Lord Sumption, Foreign Affairs in the English Courts since 9/11, Lecture at the Dep’t of
Gov’t, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. (May 14, 2012), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/
speech_120514.pdf [hereinafter Lord Sumption Speech].
117. McGoldrick, supra note 119, at 986.
118. Id. at 987.
119. Lord Sumption Speech, supra note 120. For a full discussion on the history of judicial
review in U.K. courts, see T. T. Arvind & Lindsay Stirton, The Curious Origins of Judicial Review,
133 SUSSEX L. REV. Q. 91 (2017), http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/59837/1/paper%20v5-TTA.pdf.
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C. The Modern U.K. Political Question Doctrine
The modern British political question doctrine was pronounced in
Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, commonly referred
to as the GCHQ case.120 Prior to that decision, any use of the royal
prerogative was non-justiciable. The royal prerogative exists as a matter
of historical gloss and common law and refers to powers that only the
Crown may exercise.121 Today, “Government Ministers exercise the
majority of the prerogative powers either in their own right or through
the advice they provide to the Queen which she is bound
constitutionally to follow.”122 It endows them with various powers—
from declaring war to appointing and dismissing ministers.123 GCHQ
involved the use of the royal prerogative: Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher and her Government, purportedly acting in the interest of
national security, prohibited employees of the Government
Communications Headquarters from joining trade unions.124 Because
prerogative powers developed in the common law and are not codified
in statute, any changes in the power of review would have to come from
the courts.125 The appellate court held that the use of the royal
prerogative in the national security arena precluded judicial review.126
The House of Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom at the
time, ruled that exercises of the Royal Prerogative were justiciable but
carved out several areas as immune from review.127 Lord Diplock’s
opinion in GCHQ is widely viewed as the basis for the modern rule.128
In that opinion, Diplock eschewed the prototypical approach, which
distinguished justiciability of prerogative actions based on the “legal
nature, boundaries and historical origin of ‘the prerogative . . . .’”129
Instead, GCHQ held that the question of justiciability is determined by

120. [1985] AC 374 (HL) [hereinafter GCHQ].
121. GAIL BARTLETT & MICHAEL EVERETT, U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., BRIEFING
PAPER NO. 03861, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 5 (2017). The Crown refers to both the Sovereign
(i.e., the Queen) and Government Ministers.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Q&A: Royal Prerogative, BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/4267761.stm.
124. GCHQ, [1985] AC 374 (HL).
125. Id.
126. Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] I.R.L.R. 353.
127. GCHQ, [1985] AC 374 (HL).
128. Syed Hassan, Note, RE GCHQ Judgment & Prerogative of the Crown (Aug. 2019),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335541031_Note_RE_GCHQ_Judgment_Prerogative_
of_the_Crown?channel=doi&linkId=5d6c12e24585150886064f5a&showFulltext=true
(DOI:
10.13140/RG.2.2.16328.47366).
129. Id.
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the case’s subject-matter: Cases involving executive functions remained
outside the scope of the courts’ review.130 The modern formulation of
the British Political Question Doctrine depends on the “subject matter
and suitability in the particular case.”131 Outside the scope of judicial
review lies “[p]rerogative powers such as those relating to the making
of treaties, the defence of the realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant
of honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of
ministers . . . because their nature and subject matter are such as not to
be amenable to the judicial process.”132 GCHQ came as quite a surprise
and vastly expanded the scope of judicial review. It remains the seminal
case on judicial review of prerogative powers.
D. The U.K. Political Question Doctrine in Practice: The Prorogation
Case
In 2019, the United Kingdom Supreme Court decided Miller.133
Understanding the political context surrounding the case is critical. In
a 2016 popular referendum, the British people voted to leave the
European Union (E.U.).134 “Brexit,” as it has become commonly
known, is a highly contentious and partisan issue in the United
Kingdom. The U.K. Government and the E.U. had been actively
engaged in negotiations for a Brexit deal since the 2016 referendum.135
The U.K. has since “Brexited” the E.U., but trade talks are ongoing.136
Upon the formation of a new government in July 2019, the parties
stipulated that if they could not come to an agreement before October
130. Id.
131. R (Abbasi & Anor.) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs &
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1598, [2003] UKHRR 76 [85].
132. GCHQ [1985] AC at [417–18].
133. Miller, [2019] UKSC 41.
134. Steven Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; Cameron Plans to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES
(June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-europeanunion-referendum.html.
135. Benjamin Mueller, What is Brexit? A Simple Guide to Why It Matters and What Happens
Next, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/europe/whatis-brexit.html.
136. Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887. The U.K. formally exited the European Union
on January 31, 2020. The European Union and the United Kingdom negotiated and concluded a
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which took force January 1, 2021. For the full agreement, see
The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, 2020 O.J. (L 444) 14–1462, available at
https://ec.europa.eu/info/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-trade-and-cooperation-agreement_en.
For a brief overview, see Matthias Matthijs, What’s in the EU-UK Brexit Deal?, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN
REL.
(Dec.
28,
2020),
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-eu-uk-brexitdeal?gclid=Cj0KCQiA0rSABhDlARIsAJtjfCfD6UsZdZgAnLmZ90JJG0FLOKX4xvsQrHXcIYtPGO1SC1MMJF9VksaAgKzEALw_wcB.
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31, 2019, there would be a “no-deal” Brexit, and the United Kingdom
would simply drop out of the E.U.137 This would have meant that the
two entities would automatically “divorce” on this date without any
agreements on trade, security and the like.138 A no-deal Brexit would
have posed potentially serious ramifications for the political and
economic stability of Europe. Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who took
office in July 2019, openly advocated for a no-deal Brexit.139
In August 2019, Prime Minister Johnson met with the Queen to
request a prorogation of Parliament.140 Because prorogation of
Parliament is a royal prerogative, only the Queen (or reigning
monarch) may exercise the power, on advice of Privy Council.141
Johnson requested that the Queen prorogue Parliament from no earlier
than September 9, and no later than September 12, until October 14,
leaving Parliament with approximately two weeks to reach an
agreement before the no-deal Brexit date.142 Prorogation usually
receives little fanfare—it is an otherwise unexciting parliamentary
procedure during which Parliament takes a temporary hiatus from
legislating.143 But it is not usually five weeks long.144 Johnson’s request
for prorogation received intense backlash from Parliament and the
public.145 Opponents alleged that by asking for such a long prorogation
in critical weeks leading up to the deadline, Johnson had intended to
“bypass a sovereign Parliament that opposes his policy on Brexit.”146
Challenges to the prorogation were brought in England and
Scotland. One court, the High Court of Justice for England and Wales,
found in Johnson’s favor, ruling that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question.147 Whereas, the Scottish appeals court
rejected the non-justiciability claim and ruled on the merits.148 The
cases were consolidated on “leap-frog” appeal to the U.K. Supreme

137. Mueller, supra note 135.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Parliament suspension: Queen approves PM’s plan, BBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-49493632 [hereinafter Parliament suspension].
141. Miller, [2019] UKSC 41, [3].
142. Parliament suspension, supra note 140.
143. See Sarma, supra note 5.
144. See Lengths of Prorogation since 1900, supra note 5.
145. See Sarma, supra note 5.
146. Parliament suspension, supra note 140 (quoting a statement by Sir John Major, former
Prime Minister).
147. R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB).
148. Joanna Cherry QC MP and Others for Judicial Review [2019] CSIH 49.
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Court as “Miller.”149
The Government argued that the Prime Minister’s prerogative to
prorogue Parliament, irrespective of the length of the prorogation,
presented a nonjusticiable political question.150 Because the Prime
Minister is politically accountable to Parliament, the Court “should not
enter the political arena but should respect the separation of
powers.”151 Relying in part on the Divisional Court’s holding, they
argued that the decision to prorogue Parliament was “inherently
political in nature” and that “there were no legal standards against
which to judge [its] legitimacy.”152
The U.K. Supreme Court was entirely unpersuaded by the
Government’s argument. In a unanimous decision, the Court
repudiated the political question claim and reached the merits, holding
that the Prime Minister had exceeded the limits of his power in
requesting a five-week-long prorogation.153 Responding to the political
question argument, the Court held that “although the courts cannot
decide political questions, the fact that a legal dispute concerns the
conduct of politicians, or arises from a matter of political controversy,
has never been sufficient reason for the courts to refuse to consider
it.”154 Baroness Hale, writing for the Court, acknowledged the
democratic-accountability argument made by the Prime Minister and
dismissed it forcefully: “The Prime Minister’s accountability to
Parliament does not in itself justify the conclusion that the courts have
no legitimate role to play.”155 Hale justified this conclusion for two
reasons. First, by temporarily dismissing Parliament, prorogation
necessarily precludes members of Parliament from holding the Prime
Minister accountable until Parliament has reconvened.156 Second,
political accountability and judicial review are not mutually exclusive:
“[T]he courts have a duty to give effect to the law, irrespective of the
minister’s political accountability to Parliament.”157 A minister’s
theoretical political accountability to Parliament does not render his
actions per se immune from judicial review.158
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

[2019] UKSC 41, [25].
Id. at [28].
Id.
Id. at [29].
Id. at [33], [36], [38].
Id. at [31].
Id. at [33].
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Furthermore, according to Hale, contrary to the Government’s
proposition, the Court would be giving effect to the separation of
powers by ensuring that the Government did not unlawfully frustrate
Parliament’s proper role in the constitutional system.159 Determining
whether a prerogative power exists and defining its scope are questions
of law—questions that the judiciary is singularly empowered to
answer.160
Before it could answer the justiciability question, the Court needed
to first identify legal standards by which it could evaluate the
substantive claims. Although prerogative powers are not “constituted
by any document,” they must be “compatible with common law
principles.”161 In short, “every prerogative power has its limits” and it
is the Court’s duty to determine where they lie.162 To identify those
limits, the Court looked to the constitutional principles of
Parliamentary Sovereignty (acts of Parliament are supreme and no one
is above the law), and Parliamentary Accountability (Ministers are held
accountable to the electorate by MPs who scrutinize ministerial
decisions).163 A prorogation of Parliament would therefore be unlawful
if it had “the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable
justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional
functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the
supervision of the executive.”164 Upon successfully identifying legal
standards by which it could adjudicate the case at bar, the Court
determined the case to be justiciable.165
On the merits, the Court determined the Prime Minister’s request
was unlawful because it frustrated or prevented Parliament from
exercising its constitutional duty to hold the Government accountable
on behalf of the people.166 The Court also inquired into Johnson’s
purported intent for requesting the prorogation, but was unconcerned

159. Id. at [34].
160. Id. at [36].
161. Id. at [38].
162. Id.
163. Id. at [41], [46].
164. Id. at [50].
165. Id. at [52].
166. Id. at [55–56] (“The first question, therefore, is whether the Prime Minister’s action had
the effect of frustrating or preventing the constitutional role of Parliament in holding the
Government to account. The answer is that of course it did. This was not a normal prorogation in
the run-up to a Queen’s Speech. It prevented Parliament from carrying out its constitutional role
for five out of a possible eight weeks between the end of the summer recess and exit day on the
31st October.”).
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with his subjective motive for doing so.167 Instead, it sought to answer
an objective question: whether there was any reasonable justification
for requesting that prorogation last five weeks.168 The Government
failed to carry this burden, and the Court concluded there was no
legitimate reason for the Prime Minister’s actions.169 Accordingly, the
Court invalidated the prorogation as unlawful.170
III. APPLYING LESSONS TO THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE
A. Representation Reinforcement Theory & Political System Failures
According to John Hart Ely, a “political system failure” exists when
“the process is undeserving of trust” and
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure
that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one
is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority
out of simply hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize
commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the
protection afforded other groups by a representative system.171

The representation-reinforcement theory advocates that the courts
are institutionally equipped to—and should—intervene when these
failures occur.172 Unlike elected representatives, whose primary goal is
to stay in power,173 federal judges, being appointed for life, do not share
this concern.174 This makes judges uniquely equipped to decide cases
where the political branch is incapable of doing so impartially—namely,
those cases that “either by clogging the channels of change or by acting
as accessories to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact
are not representing the interests of those whom the system
presupposes they are.”175 When the political system malfunctions,
judges should operate like referees, stepping in “only when one team is

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
(1980).
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at [58].
Id.
Id. at [59–60].
Id. at [69–70].
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103
Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 103.
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gaining unfair advantage, not because the ‘wrong team’ has scored.”176
In practice, this means the courts should adopt an “antitrust” approach
and intervene when necessary to break up what functionally amounts
to an oligarchy.177 Whether it is the executive or the legislature accreting
power, under the representation-reinforcement theory, the courts owe
a duty to protect the legitimacy of the political processes—including
the right to participate meaningfully therein. As Ely put it, “unblocking
stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought
preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the
quintessential stoppage.”178
B. Partisan Gerrymandering and Prorogation as Political System
Failures
Partisan gerrymandering is a paradigmatic example of a political
system failure. Although gerrymandering does not literally prevent
people from voting—people can still cast their votes at the ballot box—
it deprives certain votes of any real effect. With partisan
gerrymandering, the political party in power draws voting districts to
maintain their majority position. “Minority” party voters are either
“packed” into a single district, diluting their power in surrounding
districts to the advantage of the “majority,” or “cracked” across several
districts so that in each one, they will be outnumbered.179 These
methods ensure that the outcome is all but decided before election day.
In gerrymandered districts, popular elections are tainted by partisan
interference, and thus the political process is undeserving of trust.
Because partisan redistricting efforts draw electoral maps to dilute the
voting power of partisan opponents, “choking off the channels of
political change to ensure that [the incumbents] will stay in and the outs
will stay out,” they are a primary example of a political system failure.180
The majority party, even if it lacks the majority of popular votes in a
given jurisdiction, draws the districts to entrench itself in power—

176. Id. at 103.
177. Id. at 102–03. Ely does not define oligarchy, so we will assume its ordinary meaning
applies. An oligarchy is “a government in which a small group exercises control especially for
corrupt or selfish purposes.” Oligarchy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/oligarchy (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
178. ELY, supra note 171, at 117.
179. See Michael Wines, What is Gerrymandering? And Why Did the Supreme Court Rule on
It?, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/what-isgerrymandering.html.
180. ELY, supra note 171, at 103.
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debasing the political process and detrimentally impacting
constituents.
Illegitimate prorogation, too, fits Ely’s definition nicely. Again, the
process does not merit the public’s trust. In Miller, the Prime Minister
sought to circumvent the traditional political process of —
Parliamentary deliberation and bicameral approval—by dismissing
Parliament in the final weeks before the deadline and forcing their
hand into a no-deal Brexit for purely partisan gain.181 Like partisan
gerrymandering, Johnson’s prorogation falls under Ely’s first category.
But it differs from gerrymandering because voters are not directly
affected. However, as Miller concluded, the unlawful prorogation
prevented their elected representatives from holding the PM
accountable and from exercising Parliamentary checks on executive
power.182 And Prime Minister Johnson called the prorogation to do just
that: there was no other reasonable explanation for it.183 And, as the
Court found, frustrating the constitutional balance of powers is not a
reasonable justification, and contravenes the foundational principles of
Britain’s representative democracy.
In both cases, political actors have seriously degraded the proper
functioning of the political process so as to deprive of its legitimacy. In
both cases, the process itself is undeserving of trust and requires judicial
intervention.
C. Reenvisioning the U.S. Doctrine: The Search for Manageable
Standards
Miller is consistent with the representation-reinforcing theory of
judicial review. In Miller, the United Kingdom Supreme Court
recognized that the political channels had malfunctioned. Prime
Minister Johnson’s government had sought to circumvent the political
process and amass undue power for itself. As a result, Johnson’s
prorogation deprived Parliament of its opportunity to participate in
negotiations and express its dissent with a no-deal Brexit. The
prorogation also frustrated the public’s opportunity to have its interests
meaningfully represented in Parliament. The Court recognized that

181. See Parliament suspension, supra note 140 (quoting House of Commons Speaker John
Bercow who said, “However it is dressed up, it is blindingly obvious that the purpose of
[suspending Parliament] now would be to stop [MPs] debating Brexit and performing its duty in
shaping a course for the country.” (alterations in original)).
182. Miller, [2019] UKSC 41, [56–57].
183. Id. at [58–61].
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both of these consequences amounted to political system failures,
contravening the U.K.’s constitutional principles of democratic
accountability and separation of powers.184 The Court deemed it
necessary to intervene to reset the power balance and ensure that the
people’s will would be represented in Parliament without undue
inhibition by the Executive. And the Court intervened without risking
its own legitimacy: if anything, the Court was widely regarded as more
legitimate for upholding its constitutional duty and protecting
individual liberties from government infringement.185 The sky did not
fall.; the world did not end. Instead, Parliament and British government
returned to functioning normally.186
The judicially manageable standards provided in Miller could serve
as the basis for a test to adjudicate U.S. partisan gerrymandering claims.
In determining whether prorogation was unlawful, the Miller Court
sought to identify (1) the actual effects of prorogation and (2) a
legitimate government interest in the prorogation, with the
government bearing the burden of proof.187 Similarly, in partisan
gerrymandering claims, the U.S. Supreme Court should ask the
following questions: (1) Does the electoral map have the effect of
substantially frustrating constituents’ participation in the political
processes because of their political affiliation? And (2) did the
legislature, if acting without a partisan motive, have a legitimate reason
to draw the lines in the way it did, with the government bearing the
burden of proof? This showing can be rebutted by evidence of
subjective intent and facially-neutral evidence (like irregular district
shapes and mathematical analysis), but these are not required to make
a prima facie case.
Miller’s objective-intent standard would remedy challenges with
previous U.S. Supreme Court tests, which required proof of subjective
intent. In all but the most extreme cases, like Rucho, collective
subjective intent is extraordinarily difficult for challengers to prove.
Miller was entirely unconcerned with actual motive.188 Likewise,
partisan gerrymandering claims should not require a showing of
subjective intent. Instead, challengers can more easily prove an
184. Id. at [51].
185. Ian Dunt, Supreme Court bombshell: Britain is working once again, POLITICS.CO.UK
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.politics.co.uk/blogs/2019/09/24/supreme-court-bombshell-britain-isworking-once-again.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text.
188. Miller, [2019] UKSC 41, [58]; see also supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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objective standard, thereby ensuring greater protection of the right to
participate equally in the political process. The right to vote is the most
fundamental exercise of individual liberty. Representationreinforcement theory demands that courts protect the sanctity and
legitimacy of political processes. An objective-intent standard does just
that: government motives are subject to more exacting scrutiny.
Furthermore, a burden-shifting framework better protects
individual liberties and the sanctity of the political process. Before
Rucho, plaintiffs bore the entire burden in partisan gerrymandering
suits. But under this test, they would need to prove only discriminatory
impact—that members of a given party’s votes are substantially
deprived of value in popular elections—in order to make a prima facie
case. Upon this showing, the Court will ask whether it is reasonable to
believe the map would have been drawn the same way, absent partisan
gamesmanship. It then becomes the government’s burden to put on
evidence of legitimate reasons for drawing the electoral map in the way
it did.
As in pre-Rucho caselaw, challengers can rebut the government’s
justification by putting on additional evidence: irregular district shapes,
any legislative history to demonstrate subjective intent, and
mathematical analysis of the chosen map to demonstrate, for example,
how much of an outlier it is and how significantly it dilutes the votes of
partisan opponents.189 In short, the farther away the map is from neutral
center, the greater the showing of disparate impact and partisan intent.
It is critical that the government bear the burden because this provides
greater protections to voters.
This test would have caught the North Carolina and Maryland maps
at issue in Rucho. First, voters in both states (Democrats in one and
Republicans in the other) demonstrated that their votes were
systematically deprived of meaningful effect. For example, in 2012,
Republicans in North Carolina won nine of the state’s thirteen
Congressional districts (that’s nearly 75 percent of the seats), despite
only winning only 49 percent of the statewide vote.190 A disparity
margin of 25 percent would qualify as a substantial frustration. And
second, the states did not claim a non-partisan reason for constructing
the districts in the manner they did. Even if they had, it would have
been difficult to justify Maryland’s flipping of the First District as

189. See Brief for Political Science Professors, infra note 207.
190. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2510 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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anything other than sheer partisan gain.191 Evidence of the map’s
mathematical value, the redistricting committees’ flagrantly
discriminatory subjective intent, and possibly irregular district shapes
would have successfully rebutted this argument. This test would capture
the worst cases without overreaching and would be easily
administrable.
Finally, the Miller court’s judicially manageable standards and those
proposed here closely resemble those announced in Justice Kagan’s
dissent.192 There, Kagan and the lower courts had looked for effect,
intent, and causation.193 In Miller, the Court looked for effects and
objective intent.194 All of these principles are represented in the test I
propose. This reaffirms Justice Kagan’s point that judicially
manageable standards do exist, and indeed, the lower courts had
worked with them all along.195 Further still, a constitutional system
across the pond crafted judicially manageable standards, predicated on
democratic accountability and institutional competence, that could
apply reasonably well to partisan gerrymandering claims, puts the
Rucho court’s willful blindness on full display.
D. Responding to Anticipated Critiques
Critics will likely mount four primary objections. First, proving
subjective intent is a Herculean task and objective intent leaves too
much room for judicial activism. Second, this proposal does not remedy
the “textual hook” problem: it fails to provide a standard tied to
constitutional text. Third, the inquiry does not provide a bright line for
determining when a state has gone too far. And fourth, allowing
partisan gerrymandering claims to be adjudicated will open the
floodgates of litigation.
First, objectors may disagree with the decision to include an intent
inquiry at all. Subjective intent is challenging to prove in most cases
(although it would have been quite easy in Rucho).196 That is why, as
191. Id. at 2510–11.
192. Id. at 2516.
193. See id.; see also Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 852 (M.D.N.C. 2018)
(“[U]nder the standard on which we rely on to strike down those twelve districts, a state legislative
body may engage in some degree of partisan gerrymandering, so long as it was not predominantly
motivated by invidious partisan considerations.”); Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 524
(D. Md. 2018) (ruling that plaintiffs’ First Amendment Association rights were unduly burdened
by Maryland’s gerrymandering scheme).
194. Miller, [2019] UKSC at [55–56], [58].
195. Rucho, 129 S. Ct. at 2516.
196. Id. at 2522 (“Although purpose inquiries carry certain hazards (which courts must attend
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seen in Miller, an objective standard should be adopted with the
government bearing the burden of proof. Dissenters to this approach
will likely argue that an objective-intent standard leaves too much
room for courts to make policy decisions and impose their own notions
of fairness.197 But courts conduct this type of inquiry all the time without
being tempted to impose their own values. Rational basis review is
functionally an objective intent inquiry: whether the government could
have had a rational justification for making the policy choice it did.198
The objective intent standard proposed here seeks to answer the same
question.
Second, Rucho relies in part on the argument that there is no textual
hook in the Constitution which prescribes judicially manageable
standards to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims.199 It is true
that the Constitution does not explicitly address proportional
representation or gerrymandering, so naturally the objective-intent
standard does not seek guidance from text that does not exist. Instead,
the Equal Protection Clause provides sufficient guidance: the state
shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”200 But in any event, this critique is beside the
point. The entirety of equal protection jurisprudence is judicially
created. The tiers of scrutiny, for example, have no textual grounding in
the Constitution. And though some have argued that they are
unconstitutional for that reason,201 their status as accepted
constitutional doctrine seems safe for now. Similarly, nowhere in the
text of the Constitution is the “one person, one vote” standard
prescribed—yet courts regularly adjudicate those claims on the

to), they are a common form of analysis in constitutional cases.” (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 916 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
197. See id. at 2499–500 (Roberts, C.J.) (noting that a “clear, manageable and politically
neutral” test is necessary to “meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts”) (citation
omitted).
198. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
199. Rucho, 129 S. Ct. at 2499–500.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
201. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2327 (2016) (Thomas, J.
dissenting) (“The illegitimacy of using ‘made-up tests’ to ‘displace longstanding national
traditions as the primary determinant of what the Constitution means’ has long been apparent.
The Constitution does not prescribe tiers of scrutiny. The three basic tiers—’rational basis,’
intermediate, and strict scrutiny—’are no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further
element of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will be applied in
each case.’” (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567, 570, (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))).
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merits.202 Merely because a standard is not explicitly provided for in the
Constitution does not mean that one cannot exist. Otherwise, this line
of reasoning would have dire implications for the entire body of equal
protection jurisprudence.
Third, critics will argue that the effects and objective intent test is
not a bright-line rule. This is true. But in that way, it is consistent with
the body of equal protection jurisprudence: equal protection claims are
case-by-case, fact-specific inquiries. An analogy is helpful here:
apportionment, or “one person, one vote,” claims are justiciable. How
is determining whether one vote means less than another any different
in the context of partisan gerrymandering? Chief Justice Roberts
contends that unlike partisan gerrymandering claims, the “one-person,
one-vote rule is relatively easy to administer as a matter of math.”203
However, as Justice Kagan notes in dissent, these “are not your
grandfather’s—let alone the Framers’—gerrymanders.”204 Improved
technology and increased access to data have fundamentally changed
the way mapmakers craft districts: powerful computing technology
allows mapmakers to craft thousands of options for district maps and
to predict the electoral outcome of each with unprecedented
precision.205 Taken together, legislators can choose maps with near
certainty of their result.206 New technology can assign mathematical
values to the maps and place them along the spectrum, relative to the
other options.207 Contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’s belief, it is
mathematically possible to demonstrate when the state has gone too
far.208 Admittedly, this test does not draw a clear line in the sand, but
this does not render the test unadministrable. Because it is possible to
quantify a given map’s “score” compared to alternatives, the farther
outside the range of standard deviation it is, the more suspicious it will
be. Like the entire body of equal protection jurisprudence, these cases
must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis giving great weight to the
facts.
And finally, challengers will likely pose the time-immemorial
“floodgates of litigation” argument. Of course, it is true that allowing
202. Rucho, 129 S. Ct. at 2501.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Brief for Political Science Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees 22–25,
Rucho v. Common Cause, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (Nos. 18-422, 18-726).
208. Id.
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federal courts to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims will
increase litigation, given the current baseline is zero. This of itself
should not be viewed as a problem. First, depriving citizens of their
right to have an equal impact on an election solely on the basis of
political affiliation is a constitutional violation.209 They demand a
remedy, and the courts stand well-equipped to provide it. Partisan
gerrymandering is a longstanding and widespread problem that
denigrates the political process. Merely because gerrymandering
existed at the time of the nation’s birth does not make it
constitutionally permissible. Slavery and racial discrimination were
also permitted at the founding, and we rightfully outlawed those
practices long ago. In short, the right to equal impact in the political
process outweighs concerns of increased litigation. Second, this test still
requires challengers to satisfy the elements of the offense—including
showing discriminatory impact. It will only undo those districts which
substantially frustrate citizens’ participation in the political process. It
is not carte blanche to challenge each and every district across the
country.
CONCLUSION
When a branch of government impinges on individual liberties and
obstructs processes necessary for legitimate representative democracy,
it is the duty and the province of courts to intervene. Political system
failures mean that the political processes cannot themselves return to
equilibrium without help. And it is precisely because the political
branches have no incentive to constrain themselves that the courts
must intervene. Miller demonstrates that courts can do so without
falling victim to the “political thicket,” and that judicially manageable
standards exist for adjudicating constitutional claims in political system
failures. Miller illustrates why Rucho got it wrong.
Contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’s assertions, partisan
gerrymandering is not a legitimate state interest. Something so
antithetical to representative democracy is undeserving of the Court’s
sanction. In Miller, the United Kingdom Supreme Court did what the
United States Supreme Court is unwilling to do—it recognized that the
political process was not working properly. The same plague afflicts
both nations: constitutional democracies under siege by the very
people who have sworn to protect them. One has diagnosed the
209. Rucho, 129 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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problem and administered a cure. The other has left the problem
untreated, allowing the virus to continue spreading. In political system
failures, the long-term health of democracy becomes uncertain, but
intervention substantially increases the likelihood of survival.
The United States Supreme Court in Rucho purportedly grounds
its blind-eyed position in democratic legitimacy: the Court, as a
typically antimajoritarian figure must refrain from intervening in
political issues. The irony is that the Court, in tethering itself to its
notion of democratic legitimacy, has undermined the very institution it
purports to protect. The United States Supreme Court ignores the
reality of the problem.
American democracy is predicated on the idea that the government
derives its power from the people. Partisan gerrymandering deprives
voters of the right to participate meaningfully in our representative
democracy. And when the electorate can no longer express its dissent
through the normal channel—the political process—only the courts
remain as the last line of defense. It is essential to the proper
functioning of a democracy that voters are able to voice their dissent
through the political process. Without checks on state power through
judicial review, democracy itself will succumb to the political thicket.

